Triangulating Valuation  703 one of India’s largest companies, with 2018 revenues of $60 billion, has opera- tions in oil refining and marketing, petrochemicals, oil and gas exploration and production, retail, digital services, and media and entertainment. Its bal- ance sheet also includes $11 billion book value of investments that need to be valued separately (relative to a market capitalization of about $105 billion). The capital markets in which emerging-markets companies trade may have inefficiencies. In many cases, these companies may have limited float because controlling shareholders may hold large stakes. The presence of controlling shareholders (often founding families) may also raise concerns about gover- nance and whether there are potential conflicts between the interests of pub- lic shareholders and the controlling shareholders. This could lead to a lower share price than otherwise warranted. Some countries (particularly China and India) also have restrictions on investors, or the governments actively inter- vene in the markets, causing deviations in share prices from intrinsic values. For example, in China, Chinese citizens are not allowed to invest in shares outside the country, so the share prices of mainland Chinese companies can be disconnected from intrinsic value and the value of similar companies outside China. This could be caused by an imbalance of supply and demand for shares that cannot be corrected by arbitrage with other equity markets. Unlike most markets, the Chinese traded market is also dominated by retail investors (75 percent of holdings), roughly the reverse of the U.S. market, where institu- tional investors own most shares. Retail investors aren’t as sophisticated and don’t do as much research as institutional investors. They also tend to move in the same direction, leading to large swings in prices. Such market inefficien- cies can make it difficult to reconcile DCF values with market values. Finally, companies in emerging markets often have complex corporate structures with voting and nonvoting shares. This often leads to a small group of investors controlling the company even though they own less than 50 percent. In some countries with weak governance, public market investors will discount the value of these companies if they don’t believe the controlling shareholders make decisions in the interests of all shareholders. Triangulating Valuation We recommend triangulating the results of the scenario DCF approach with a comparable multiples approach and DCF using a country risk premium. We’ll illustrate with the example of a Brazilian retail company we’ll call ConsuCo. We constructed two scenarios, a business-as-usual case (the base case) and a downside case reflecting performance under adverse economic conditions. Exhibit 35.5 shows the ROIC projections. Brazil has experienced several severe economic and monetary downturns, including an inflation rate that topped 2,000 percent in 1993. Judging by its key financial indicators, such as EBITDA 704  Emerging Markets EXHIBIT 35.5  ConsuCo: ROIC and Financials, Base Case vs. Downside Scenario –30 –25 –20 –15 –10 –5 0 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 ROIC (excluding goodwill) 5 10 15 20 25 Downside real Base case real Downside nominal Base case nominal Financials, % 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Nominal indicators: Base case Sales growth 15.3 14.5 13.6 12.6 11.7 10.8 Adjusted EBITA/sales 6.1 6.2 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 NOPAT/sales 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.4 Invested capital (excluding goodwill)/sales 54 53 51 51 50 49 Invested capital (including goodwill)/sales 62 59 57 56 55 54 ROIC (excluding goodwill) 8.1 8.5 9.0 9.0 8.9 9.0 Free cash flow, reais million (63) (136) (94) (91) (85) 113 Nominal indicators: Downside scenario Sales growth 10.0 25.0 66.3 66.3 25.0 11.3 Adjusted EBITA/sales 3.1 (2.2) (8.0) (7.6) (1.1) 3.3 NOPAT/sales 2.3 (1.5) (5.8) (5.8) (1.1) 2.2 Invested capital (excluding goodwill)/sales 55 47 31 22 21 22 Invested capital (including goodwill)/sales 63 54 35 25 23 24 ROIC (excluding goodwill) 4.2 (3.2) (18.6) (25.7) (5.0) 9.9 Free cash flow, reais million (149) (777) (2,533) (4,504) (2,677) (558) to sales and real-terms sales growth, the impact on ConsuCo’s business per- formance had been significant. ConsuCo’s cash operating margin had been negative for four years, at around –10 to –5 percent, before recovering to its normal levels. In the same period, sales in real terms declined by 10 to 15 percent per year but grew sharply after the crisis. For the downside scenario projections, we assumed similar negative cash margins and a decline in sales, in real terms, for up to five years, followed by a gradual return to the long- term margins and growth assumed under the business-as-usual scenario.