Markets and Fundamentals: The Evidence  103 why a modestly growing company, like the high-ROIC consumer packaged goods company Clorox, ends up on the growth-stock list. Decades of Consistent Returns Similarly, market bubbles and crises have always captured public attention, fu- eling the belief that the stock market moves in chaotic ways, detached from economic fundamentals. The 2008 financial crisis, the technology bubble of the 1990s, the Black Monday crash of October 1987, the leveraged-buyout (LBO) craze of the 1980s, and, of course, the Wall Street crash of 1929 appear to confirm such ideas. But the facts tell a different story. Despite these occurrences, U.S. equities over the past 200 years have delivered decade after decade of consistent returns to shareholders of about 6.75 percent annually, adjusted for inflation. Over the long term, the stock market has been far from chaotic (Exhibit 7.3). The origins of this 6.75 percent total shareholder return (TSR) lie in the fundamental performance of companies and the long-term cost of equity. TSR is simply the sum of the relative share price appreciation plus the cash yield (see Exhibit 7.4). Over the past 70 years, corporate profits in the United States have grown about 3 to 3.5 percent per year in real terms, and the median P/E has hovered around a level of about 15 to 17.7 If P/Es revert to a normal level over time, share price appreciation should therefore amount to around 3 to 3.5 percent per year. Moreover, corporate America typically reinvests about EXHIBIT 7.3  Stock Performance against Bonds in the Long Run, 1801–2018 $ 0 10 1 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 1,000,000 10,000,000 100,000,000 Stocks Stocks (inflation-adjusted) Bonds Bills CPI 1801 1816 1831 1846 1861 1876 1891 1906 1921 1936 1951 1966 1981 1996 2011 2018 Source: J. J. Siegel, Stocks for the Long Run: The Definitive Guide to Financial Market Returns and Long-Term Investment Strategies (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2014); R. G. Ibbotson, 2019 SBBI Yearbook (Duff & Phelps). 7 Note that the P/E is stable if long-term growth rates, returns on capital, and costs of equity are stable. 104 The STock MarkeT IS SMarTer Than You ThInk 40 to 50 percent of profi ts every year to achieve this profi t growth, leaving the remainder to be paid to shareholders as dividends and share repurchases. The resulting 50 to 60 percent payout ratio is not a coincidence: it follows from a typical 12 to 14 percent return on equity for U.S. companies, combined with 3 to 3.5 percent growth in real terms, or 5 to 6 percent including infl ation. It translates to a cash yield to shareholders (that is, the inverse of the P/E times the payout ratio) of around 3.5 percent at the long-term average P/E of 15 to 17. Adding the cash yield to the annual 3 to 3.5 percent share price apprecia- tion results in total real shareholder returns of about 6.5 to 7 percent per year. p/e Fundamentals Some analysts miss an important element of stock returns: the gains are driven by both share price appreciation and cash yields. In the view of these analysts share prices cannot increase faster than corporate profi ts. But this perspective erroneously misses the cash distributions entirely. Other experts have been too pessimistic about the share price appreciation component when they’ve predicted convergence of the P/E toward long-term average levels. Their estimates for the long-term average level are too low because they incorporate the 1970s and 1980s, when P/Es were severely depressed because of exceptionally high infl ation levels. 8 EXHIBIT  7.4 Economic Fundamentals Explain Long-Term Total Shareholder Returns Range of annual performance over past 70 years Total shareholder return1 6.5%–7.0% Share price appreciation 3.0%–3.5% Cash yield 3.25%–3.75% Payout ratio2 50%–60% P/E 15X–17X Change in P/E 0.0%–0.0% Profit growth1 3.0%–3.5% Return on capital3 12%–14% 1 Measured in real terms. 2 Estimated as (1 – growth/return on capital), where growth is real-terms profit growth plus inflation at 2.0%–2.5%. 3 Long-term average ROIC—recent years have been above average levels. 8 In addition, Robert Shiller’s measure of the current P/E is overestimated because it does not exclude ex- traordinary losses such as goodwill impairments. See J. Siegel, “Don’t Put Faith in Cape Crusaders,” Financial Times , August 20, 2013; “Siegel vs. Shiller: Is the Stock Market Overvalued?,” Knowledge@Wharton, Septem- ber 18, 2018, knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/siegel-shiller-stock-market/ .