impulse to tell stories. For example, a team from Emily B. Falk’s neuroscience lab at the Annenberg School at the University of Pennsylvania has used functional magnetic resonance imaging to study the brains of people making decisions whether to share health news stories. The team concluded that people tended to share content that enhances self-related thoughts—that is, information that “engages neural activity in regions related to such processes [self- presentation or mental concept], especially in medial prefrontal cortex,” and that “involves cognitions or forecasts about the mental states of others.”3 In other words, these people are more willing to share their health information in the form of stories about themselves and others. Paul J. Zak, a neuroeconomist, has shown experimentally that narratives with a “dramatic arc” increase levels of the hormones oxytocin and cortisol in the listener’s bloodstream, as compared with more “flat” narratives.4 These hormones in turn have well-documented effects on behavior. Oxytocin, sometimes called the “love hormone,” plays a role in facilitating relationships. Cortisol, sometimes called the “stress hormone,” has been shown to play a role in regulating blood sugar, assisting memory formation, and reducing inflammation. Neurological Responses to Stories Evoking Fear News media and popular discussions have long described financial crises as panics created by a spate of sudden economic failures following a period of excessive complacency about economic risks. It may seem like journalistic hype to use charged words such as panic, which conjures images of a stampeding mob trying to escape a sudden physical danger, and complacency, which suggests a sort of smug stupor. Yet people mostly seem perfectly rational during such financial events, which take place over months and years of largely normal living, and they tend to present themselves as sorting through the facts. Even during a financial “panic,” people seem mostly normal and relaxed, joking and laughing. But are panic and complacency really so far off the mark? Both words describe mental states that must be supported through neurological structures. We need to study those structures to determine whether there is any common neurology between financial panics and other panics, between financial complacency and other types of complacency. Consider an example that is current during the writing of this book: the pattern of increasing risk taking by banks as the tenth anniversary of the 2007–9 world financial crisis approached. In 2017, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation issued a report expressing concern that US banks, in a reach for yield, were taking excessive risks by extending the maturity of their investments. For nearly ten years after the financial crisis, interest rates had been very low, though higher at longer maturities. Reaching for these higher yields was risky for banks, because if interest rates suddenly increased, they might have to pay more to keep depositors than they earn from the longer-maturity investments, which could cause the banks serious trouble. Ultimately, the banks decided to take the risk, but how did they form their expectations of future interest rates? No expert has a proven record of forecasting interest rates years into the future. No one can tell a banker how long to wait out a period of low interest rates or guarantee that the low rates will go on forever. All that bankers have are fading memories of narratives of other historical periods when interest rates rose dramatically, leading droves of depositors to run to their banks and withdraw their money. Those stories seem less relevant when interest rates have been low for ten years, but there is no way to quantify how much less relevant.