Henry Kissinger quoted Chinese officials as saying, “The last thing the US imperialists are willing to see is a
victory by Soviet revisionists in a Sino-Soviet war, as this would [allow the Soviets] to build up a big empire
more powerful than the American empire in resources and manpower.”18
I also know that Zhou Enlai, a reformist, had wanted to build a strategic relationship with the United States for
decades because a close Chinese friend of mine, Ji Chaozhu, who was Zhou Enlai’s interpreter for 17 years and
interpreted in the first Kissinger-Zhou Enlai talks, told me that that was the case.19 China wanted to open a
relationship with the United States to neutralize the Russian threat and in the hope that would enhance its
geopolitical and economic position. Because in 1971 it was especially clear that it was in the interests of both
China and the United States to build a relationship, they both made overtures to establish relations. In July 1971
Henry Kissinger and then in February 1972 Richard Nixon went to China to open relations, and in October 1971
the United Nations recognized the Mao-led communist Chinese government and gave China a seat on the Security
Council. During Nixon’s February 1972 visit, Nixon and Zhou Enlai signed an agreement (the Shanghai
Communique), in which the US stated that it “acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait
maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The United States government does not
challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese
themselves. With this perspective in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all US forces and
military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations
on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.” In US-China relations, the reunification with Taiwan stands
out as the most consistently contentious issues with the promise of reunification often offered and then pulled
back from the Chinese.
After these 1971-72 moves of rapprochement and appeasement, US relations with China and trade and other
exchanges began.
1976 was momentous because that was the year Zhou Enlai died (in January 1976), Mao Zedong died (in
September 1976), and China faced its first generational change.
From 1976 to 1978 there was a fight for power between the Gang of Four (hardline conservatives who fostered the
Cultural Revolution) and the reformists (who wanted economic modernization and opening up to the outside world
and were against the Cultural Revolution). Deng and the reformists won, leading to Deng Xiaoping becoming the
paramount leader in 1978. There are always political fights about how to govern and who should have what
powers. They are especially brutal when the power transition process is not crystal-clear and abided by all the
key players who have power. Amid this political fighting there are different factions that both fight with the
other factions and compromise to make decisions to govern. For the governing system of an entity to survive
(i.e., of a family, an organization, an empire, a dynasty) these factions must put the entity’s survival and
prosperity above all else, certainly above any individual’s opinions and power, and reach compromises to
achieve that sustainability. That was the case in China at the time. There were factions of leaders of the
communist revolution who cared deeply about this new dynasty’s survival (i.e., the Communist Party’s survival)
and were in the positions to make decisions about how it should be managed. In the time between Mao’s death and
Deng gaining the primary leadership role, a consensus among those powerful leaders was reached to give the
interim leadership role to another senior leader (Hua Guofeng), who was a classic compromise choice in that he
lacked the strength to be too offensive to most people and to retain the leadership position. The more hardline
Gang of Four faction, which was led by Mao’s wife, lacked skills, lacked broad support, and, with Mao gone,
lacked the leader’s support, so they were quickly disposed of. Deng, who was very experienced, committed to
China’s communist revolution since its earliest days, and widely respected, was an obvious choice to either be a
top administrator (i.e., premier) or a rival to Hua. Over time broad support among senior party loyalists, especially
the reformists, emerged for Deng to be the primary leader among equals, which led to his gradual ascendency.
At the same time increased threats from Vietnamese and Soviet activities appeared. In 1978 Vietnam and the
Soviet Union signed an agreement to expand their military cooperation, which led to a Russian military buildup in
Vietnam, and the Vietnamese government rounded up massive numbers of ethnic Chinese and put them into
detention camps. As a principle, when there is weak and divided leadership, especially during leadership
transitions, enemies see this as a time of vulnerability in which there is increased likelihood that they will make
an attack of some sort. With the leadership transition going on in China and with the moves by Vietnam and
the Soviets perceived as threatening, that was feared to be the case.