[21] de Vries & van der Woude, The First Modern Economy, 455
[22] de Vries & van der Woude, The First Modern Economy, 126
[23] de Vries & van der Woude, The First Modern Economy, 685-686
[24] de Vries & van der Woude, The First Modern Economy, 455
[25] de Vries & van der Woude, The First Modern Economy, 455-456 & https://www.britannica.com/event/Anglo-
Dutch-Wars
[26] This chart only shows the financial results from the Dutch East India Company reported "in patria," e.g., the
Netherlands. It does not include the part of the revenue and debt from its operations in Asia but does include its
revenues from goods it retrieved in Asia and sold in Europe.
[27] Quinn & Roberds, “Death of a Reserve Currency,” 17
[28] “Guilder” in this case refers to devaluing bank deposits in guilder from the Bank of Amsterdam, not physical
coin. For details on the run, see Quinn & Roberds, “Death of a Reserve Currency,” 16.
[29] Quinn & Roberds, “Death of a Reserve Currency,” 17-18
[30] Quinn & Roberds, “Death of a Reserve Currency,” 16
[31] Quinn & Roberds, “Death of a Reserve Currency,” 34
[32] Quinn & Roberds, “Death of a Reserve Currency,” 15-16
[33] The Bank of Amsterdam was ahead its time and used ledgers instead of real “paper money.” See Quinn &
Roberds, “The Bank of Amsterdam Through the Lens of Monetary Competition,” 2
[34] Quinn & Roberds, “Death of a Reserve Currency,” 19, 26
[35] Quinn & Roberds, “Death of a Reserve Currency,” 19-20
[36] Quinn & Roberds, “Death of a Reserve Currency,” 16
[37] Quinn & Roberds, “Death of a Reserve Currency,” 24
[38] de Vries & van der Woude, The First Modern Economy, 685-686
[39] Encyclopedia Britannica, The Dutch East India Company, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Dutch-East-
India-Company; also see de Vries & van der Woude, The First Modern Economy, 463-464
[40] Historical data suggests that by 1795, bank deposits were trading at a -25% discount to actual coin. Quinn &
Roberds, “Death of a Reserve Currency,” 26.
[41] Note: To fully represent the likely economics of a deposit holder at the Bank of Amsterdam, we assumed
depositors each received their pro-rated share of precious metal still in the bank's vaults when it was closed (that
was roughly 20% of the fully backed amount, thus the approximately 80% total devaluation).
[42] Gelderblom & Jonker, "Exporing the Market for Government Bonds in the Dutch Republic (1600-1800)," 16
[43] For example, see Catherine Schenk, The Decline of Sterling: Managing the Retreat of an International
Currency, 1945–1992, 37 (hereafter referred to as Schenk, Decline of Sterling)
[44] See Schenk, Decline of Sterling, 39
[45] For an overview of the convertibility crisis and devaluation, see Schenk, Decline of Sterling, 68-80; Alec
Cairncross & Barry Eichengreen, Sterling in Decline: The Devaluations of 1931, 1949, and 1967, 102-147
(hereafter referred to as Cairncross & Eichengreen, Sterling in Decline).
[46] Schenk, Decline of Sterling, 44
[47] Schenk, Decline of Sterling, 31
[48] Alex Cairncross, Years of Recovery: British Economic Policy 1945-51, 124-126
[49] Schenk, Decline of Sterling, 63